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PREFACE

The Department of Modern and Contemporary World History of the Attila József University in Szeged is starting an Acta series in foreign languages. Our undertaking is not unprecedented. The present volume is an organic part of the volumes of Acta Historica Studies on Modern and Contemporary History which have already been published in the Hungarian language. By starting publications in foreign languages we intend to become part of international historiography and at the same time we should like to see the international reception of our work.

Though the necessarily short papers in the present volume do not reflect the whole range of the research done in our department, they represent the old and traditional as well as the new fields of our historical studies. In the middle - 1970s, under the guidance of Professor Dániel Csátári, our department started the examination of the 19th and 20th history of Central and Eastern Europe with particular emphasis on the question of nations and nationalities and the situation of the Hungarian national minorities of in Yugoslavia, Poland and Romania. The results of the work done in the past 15 years are shown in several doctoral dissertations and monographs and a number of papers. Let me mention only a few of the more important ones: DÁNIEL CSATÁRI: *Dans la tourmente. Les relations hungaro-roumaines de 1940 à 1945.* [In *Torment. Hungarian-Romanian Relations 1940-1945.*] Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1974 419 p.; ISTVÁN LAGZI: *Droga żołnierza polskiego przez węgierską granicę w latach 1939-1941.* [A Polish Soldier's Journey through the Hungarian Border] Poznań, 1987 329 p.; ERNŐ RAFFAY: *Erdély 1918-1919-ben.* [Transylvania in 1918-1919] Magvető Kiadó, Budapest, 1987 389 p.; ENIKŐ A. SAJTI: *Délvidék 1941-1944 A magyar kormányok délszláv politikája.* [The South Region 1941-1944. The Southern Slav Policy of Hungarian Governments.] Kossuth Kiadó, Budapest, 1987 305 p.

Last year - after the retirement of Professor Csátári - there were some changes in the staff of our department, which also meant that the range of our studies - which had been concentrated on Central and Eastern Europe - widened concerning the number of the subjects and the countries which are dealt with.

Strong emphasis has been laid on Hungarian studies and - due to the work done by the new members of our staff - on the study of the modern and contemporary history of the European semi-periphery, particularly Portugal and Cuba. The study of the 19th century economic history of Central and Eastern Europe has also been started. In the present volume these changes are represented by the papers written by GYÖRGY KUKOVECZ, LAJOS PÁNDI and myself. The modern and contemporary history of Western Europe has been thought at our department ever since its establishment. The research done in this field reached the right stage for LAJOS KÖVÉR to write a paper on a French subject.

Our present volume is not restricted to one topic; it is rather more characterised by a variety of subjects. The phenomena and events studied in the papers cannot be squeezed between strict time limits. While compiling the book our main consideration was to show the findings of our research, which, by virtue of their variety, are characteristic of the work done at our department.

Szeged, 18th October 1989

Enikő A. Sajti
Chair

LE TEMOIGNAGE DES PRISONNIERS DE GUERRE FRANÇAIS SUR LEUR VIE QUOTIDIENNE EN HONGRIE (1793-1794)

Le témoignages qui sont à notre disposition sur la vie quotidienne des premiers prisonniers de guerre de la Révolution française en Hongrie nous sont parvenus par ses soldats eux mêmes qui - retournés en France - composèrent leurs mémoires de captivité.

Leur histoire, leur sort sont plus ou moins connus; pourtant, dans leurs témoignages, dans leurs mémoires reste beaucoup de renseignements précieux à exploiter pour l'historien, et - de tout manière - c'est une page spéciale et particulièrement intéressante de l'histoire des relations franco-hongroises. Les sources en question permettent de compléter nos connaissances dans le domaine de l'histoire militaire aussi bien que de servir et de présenter la vie quotidienne des prisonniers français et d'étudier leurs relations avec la population hongroise et avec les autorités civiles.

Quoique la guerre ait été déclarée à l'Autriche le 20 avril 1792, la problématique des premiers prisonniers de guerre apparaît seulement un an après, en 1793.

A la suite du changement de champ de Dumouriez, l'armée de la Coalition s'engage dans une guerre de forteresses. Cobourg commence l'invasion du Nord. Il dispose de plus de cent mille hommes: quarante-cinq mille Autrichiens, treize mille Anglais commandés par York, douze mille Hanovriens, huit mille Hessois, quinze mille Hollandais, huit mille Prussiens. Avec une extrême lenteur, il se dirige sur la ligne Condé - Valenciennes - Le Quesnoy.

Desormais le nombre des prisonniers français augmente de jour en jour. Mais il fallait se rendre compte, que ces soldats n'étaient plus de simples mercenaires au moment de la prise de Condé, Valenciennes, Le Quesnoy, mais de vrais patriotes, révolutionnaires et même agitateurs; des messâgres de la Liberté - Égalité - Fraternité de la Révolution.

La force de la nation, et le défi d'une guerre idéologique choque la vieille Europe. Il est évident que ces soldats ne sont plus les recrutes de l'armée royale, et que leurs officiers ne sont plus les représentants de la noblesse, faciles à recon-

vertir et prêts à changer de camp. Ainsi, le problème des prisonniers de guerre deviendra en même temps un problème politique de première importance. Pour le résoudre, la vieille Europe invente le prototype du camp de prisonniers isolé, placé loin du pays d'origine et facile à surveiller, et qui est capable d'accueillir grand nombre de prisonniers.

Pour le commandement militaire autrichien, les forteresses de Sud-Est de Hongrie, qui ont perdu beaucoup de leur importance stratégique avec la décadence de l'Empire Turc, comme lieu de détention, offrent une solution idéale. L'itinéraire du transport était le suivant: du champ de bataille, les prisonniers étaient conduits à Kintzbourg, ensuite, par voie fluviale (sur le Danube, sur la Drave, sur la Theiss) ils étaient transportés dans cette région lointaine, où les travaux préparatifs avaient été déjà entrepris pour assurer leur accueil, depuis le mois d'août. En effet, on s'est mis à renover les casernes, on a enregistré leur capacité d'accueil. Malgré tout cela, leur installation, les problèmes sanitaires et les inconvénients politique, tous ensemble, mettaient en sérieuses difficultés les autorités militaires.¹

Quant à la France, c'était la Convention Nationale qui s'est occupée pour la première fois avec les problèmes des prisonniers français, et ceci dès les mois d'été de l'année 1793. D'après la proposition de Cambacérès on a décrété: "La Convention Nationale sur la proposition d'un de ses membres, décrète que le ministre de la guerre sera tenue de nommer dans ses bureaux, un ou plusieurs commis pour recevoir les secours destinés aux prisonniers de guerre, les enregistrer, et les leur faire parvenir directement et sans aucun frais. Ces commis fourniront quittance du montant de ces secours, et demeureront responsables. Le présent décret ne prive point les citoyens de la faculté d'envoyer directement des fonds aux prisonniers de guerre."²

L'intensité de l'activité militaire révélait rapidement les insuffisances des plans d'installation. Par exemple, le Conseil de Guerre Suprême prévoyait l'installation

1 Zoltán Barcsay-Amant: *Les prisonnières de guerre de la Révolution française en Hongrie. La première année de leur établissement.* 1793. Budapest, 1934.

2 *Le Moniteur*, 24 juin 1793 p. 714.

de quatre mille prisonniers français à partir de l'été 1793, mais les rapports parlaient de plus de sept mille, et en octobre ils avançaient un chiffre beaucoup plus élevé encore; - onze mille prisonniers. Il fallait donc modifier le plan établi, et rajouter aux lieux de détention fortifiés du Sud-Est de Hongrie (Szeged, Temesvár, Arad, Pétervárad, Eszék etc.) d'autres régions, comme la Transylvanie (Fogaras, Gyulafehérvár, Medgyes, Nagyszeben etc.), quelques forteresses du Nord-Ouest (Győr, Pozsony etc.) une forteresse sub-carpathique (Munkács) et même celles de Pest et Buda, au centre du pays. De plus, sous la pression d'une multitude inattendue de prisonniers - et malgré la volonté expresse de l'empereur François - ils étaient également installés en Styrie et en Basse-Autriche.³

Deux facteurs ont défini principalement la situation des prisonniers: leur conditions hygiéniques d'abord, et leur hygiène mentale, ensuite; c'est à dire le fait qu'ils avaient été "contaminés" politiquement, par conséquent, ils étaient considérés comme des éléments dangereux en Hongrie.

La mortalité des transports s'élevait de quinze à vingt pour-cent. Le scorbut, la diarrhée, la dysentée, la fièvre des blessés avaient leur victimes. Avec l'arrivée du mauvais temps, le nombre des malades ne cessait pas d'augmenter: n'oublions pas, que la majorité des prisonniers de guerre s'est arrivée en Hongrie en fin d'automne, et l'hiver faisait geler les rivières: ils devaient faire le reste du chemin à la marche. Du point de vue de leur condition physique les rapports militaires distinguaient trois niveaux: ceux qui étaient en bonne santé, ensuite les transportables, enfin ceux, qu'on devait laisser hospitaliser le plus rapidement possible. Ces derniers pouvaient rester dans les hôpitaux militaires de Presbourg et de Pest. Des feux et de la fumée témoignèrent souvent le passage des prisonniers français et la peur de la population locale d'une épidémie.⁴

Les mémoires nous permettent la reconstruction de l'itinéraire du transport aussi bien que la présentation de la vie quotidienne des prisonniers français. Dans la présente étude je me suis appuyé sur deux mémoires: ceux du général Dellard ont été rédigés juste après événements, mais le manuscrit de ces Mémoires a été

3 Jean-Paul Bertaud: *La vie quotidienne des soldats de la Révolution 1789-1799*. Hachette, 1985. pp. 258-263.

4 Zoltán Barcsay-Amant: op. cit. pp. 70-78.

perdu pendant la campagne de Russie en 1812. Il les reconstituait par la suite, mais ce nouveau manuscrit n'était que partiellement retrouvé. La partie qui a été publiée apporte une contribution intéressante à l'histoire des premiers prisonniers de guerre de la Révolution française. Nous avons retrouvé également un autre manuscrit quasiment oublié: celui du "Manifeste" du capitaine Joseph Hautière, écrit en 1796, à son retour de Hongrie, dans un style peut-être trop souvent déclamatoire et très proche de la langue parlée, mais qui représente tout de même une authenticité remarquable, et contient des renseignements précieux.

Leurs impressions, leurs expériences semblent être déterminées avant tout par des péripéties et par des souffrances du transport qui les menait vers la Hongrie.

Le premier mémorialiste, le général Dellard commençait son voyage involontaire et forcé à Cologne, ensuite, en arrivant au bord du Danube il continuait par la voie fluviale, avec d'autres prisonniers français, sur des radeaux de bois: "Nous faisons par jour de vingt à trente lieues - écrit-il. Il fallait conséquemment se pourvoir de vivres dans les endroits où nous couchions sur les bords du fleuve. Un bateau qu'on appelait l'Infirmier nous suivait, portant les malades du convoi. Malheur à celui qui y mettait les pieds, il était à l'instant trappé d'une espèce de peste qui l'envoyait bientôt au tombeau. Tous les soirs, on en retirait les cadavres de malheureux qui avaient succombé à cette affreuse épidémie et on les enterrait sur le bord de l'eau. Il n'était pas rare d'en voir jeter encore vivants dans les fosses mortuaires, creusées par les prisonniers eux-mêmes, sous la surveillance de notre escorte. ... En passant sous Vienne, un grand nombre de malades qui avaient jusqu'alors évité d'aller à l'infirmier, demandèrent à entrer à l'hôpital. Cette grâce leur fut refusée..."⁵

Après cette traversée dramatique et pleine de souffrances les conditions de vie de Dellard se sont améliorées, lorsqu'il est arrivé dans un camp de prisonniers à Djakovo, aux frontières de la Turquie; là 300 officiers vivaient dans un ancien camp militaire: "Le local qu'ils occupaient avait jadis servi d'infirmier à la cavalerie autrichienne dans la dernière guerre contre la Turquie. Les officiers français

5 Général baron François Dellard: *Mémoires militaires sur les guerres de la République et de l'Empire*. Paris, 1882. p. 41.

étaient par chambrées et vivaient à l'ordinaire comme des soldats. Cet arrangement était le seul qui nous convint, vu la modicité de notre paye et l'impossibilité de vivre isolément. Des soldats français qu'on nous avait permis de retirer des casernes de Temeswar, place située dans notre voisinage et où ils mourraient comme des mouches, allaient nous chercher des provisions dans le bourg voisin et nous servaient en même temps de Cuisiniers."⁶

Le 8 novembre 1793 le capitaine Joseph Hautière et ses camarades arrivèrent aux cantons préparés dans les environs de Kintzbourg, en attendant les ordres pour l'embarquement. "Les barques - écrit-il - sur lesquelles nous étions montés étaient d'une construction faible et peu sûre. Le nombre n'ayant pas été suffisant, on construisit des radeaux sur lesquels on mit les malheureux soldats. Un ou deux officiers, chargés de l'inspection de ces misérables, avaient seuls une espèce de cabane construite sur le milieu du radeau, où ils se mettaient à l'abri du mauvais temps et se chauffaient à l'aide d'une espèce de poêle qu'on y avait mis.

Depuis notre embarquement, les soldats furent séparés des officiers et ne purent conséquemment en recevoir des secours dans les moments où ils avaient le plus besoin.

Notre destination était pour Pest, Mungatz, Esseg, Segedhin, Temeswar, Grand-Waradin et Ratza, villes de la basse Hongrie et la plupart voisines de la Turquie.

Pendant les premiers jours de notre trajet sur le fleuve, nous ne perdîmes pas beaucoup de soldats, mais lorsque nous commençâmes à nous approcher de l'Autriche, chaque jour, nous voyions sur les rives de ce fleuve des cadavres jetés ça et là, le mauvais temps, le manque de vivres, l'abandon des malades, tout, en un mot, conspirait notre destruction. Nos chefs d'escorte n'en pouvaient moins; on ne leur donnait aucun moyen de soulager l'humanité souffrante. Nous eûmes une perte assez considérable depuis Kintzbourg à Lintz."⁷

⁶ Général baron François Dellard: op. cit. p. 54.

⁷ "Manifeste du traitement des prisonniers français pendant leur captivité (en Hongrie) en 1793, 94 et 95, par le citoyen Joseph Hautière, capitaine au 6^e bataillon de Soissons, fait prisonnier à l'affaire du 12 septembre 1793, à Avesnelebec" Bibliothèque Nationale - Manuscrits 10173.

Le 23 décembre 1783 ils sont arrivés à l'hôpital de Pest. "Ce bâtiment immense à trois quarts de lieue de Pest, est bâti sur la rive gauche du Danube - écrit-il. Les colonnes du Quesnoy et de l'affaire d'Avesnelesec achevèrent de remplir ce lieu par le grand nombre de malades qu'elles avaient. Ces malheureux restèrent trois à quatre jours sans recevoir aucun soulagement. Le petit nombre de bien portants fut transféré à Mungatz. Dans l'espace de quinze jours, 12 à 1800 prisonniers furent détruits, sans secours suffisants pour se soulager au besoin; point de chirurgiens instruits, sans linge pour changer, couverts de vermines, sans cesse en butte aux injures et à la barbarie des officiers de police, beaucoup ne purent résister à tant de crautés: chaque jour, plus ou moins de malheureux étaient sacrifiés.

Pendant le fort de maladie, un tomberau était continuellement occupé à transporter les morts dans les trous immenses des sables de la rive droite du fleuve, où des milliers de victimes demandent à hautes cris vengeance des assassinats commis en leur personne."⁸

La vie quotidienne des prisonniers français avait été déterminée avant tout par l'attitude des autorités militaires autrichiennes, mais leurs conditions de vie réelle - souvent malgré la volonté expresse du Haut Commandement militaire - changeaient de localité en localité.

Ainsi, par exemple à Djakovo - écrit Dellard - nous vivions bien; les subsistances étaient faciles à se procurer et peu couteuses. Une oie, par exemple, ne valait que six à sept sous. ... Nous jouâmes, il est vrai, quelques pièces du Théâtre-Français, particulièrement de Voltaire, mais elles ne pouvaient nullement porter atteinte au bon ordre et encore moins à l'esprit des sujets de François II. Ce qui n'empêcha pas que trois de nos principaux acteurs ne fussent enlevés de nuit et conduit en Transylvanie, où ils expièrent par une plus longue captivité l'innocent plaisir que ce délassement leur avait procuré."⁹

Les mémoires du capitaine Joseph Hautière insistent sur les difficultés financières des soldats prisonniers. "En vain nous avons voulu soulager les malheureux

8 Joseph Hautière: op. cit.

9 Général baron François Dellard: op. cit. p. 58.

soldats: les officiers autrichiens y ont mis opposition. On empêchait ces misérables d'entrer dans les salles d'officiers, et des sentinelles veillaient à ce qu' ils ne reçussent aucun secours de leurs chefs. On a encore, depuis ce temps malheureux, cherché à faire passer des fonds aux soldats, mais le gouvernement de Pest s'y est opposé. Il y a seulement eu 200 florins qu'on a remis au lieutenant commandant à l'hôpital de Pest, et il est prouvé que cet argus n'a distribué qu'une cinquantaine de florins tout au plus. Voici l'emploi qu'il en a fait. Il donnait environ un quart once de tabac à fumer ou en poudre pour 10 à 12 malheureux. Cette réparation se faisait sur le nombre de soldats qui se trouvaient à l'hôpital et tous les 10 à 15 jours. Ainsi, sur 100 ou 200 soldats s'y trouvaient alors cette somme n'a jamais pu être entièrement dépensée. Qu' est devenu le reste? Ceci n'est pas bien difficile à trouver. Prud-homme, commandant au 3^e, bataillon de Paris, avait remis au capitaine de police à Grand-Varadin, une somme 30 à 40 florins pour être distribuée aux soldats de son bataillon; on la lui a remise, en répondant que le cabinet de Vienne avait fait une défense expresse de rien laisser passer aux prisonniers des officiers."¹⁰

Pourtant, les Conseils des municipalités conformément aux ordres du Conseil de Guerre et aux décisions du Haut-Commandement, devaient prendre plusieurs initiatives pour régulariser la situation des prisonniers de guerre; les médecins et les guérisseurs des villes concernées ont été mobilisés, "pour accomplir sans tarder, leur tâche", c'est à dire pour soigner les prisonniers, tout en prévoyant, que "les soins quotidiens des malades soient assurés par leurs camarades."¹¹ Pour éviter une épidémie, les malades contagieux ont été isolés dans des maisons et de greniers disponibles de la ville en question.¹² De toute évidence, dans ces conditions il n'était pas possible de les surveiller sérieusement. D'autre part, l'étiquette militaire de l'ancien régime voulait que l'officier soit considéré en gentilhomme dans toutes conditions, et ceci supposait également une liberté de mouvement beaucoup plus large en ville pour eux. Il n'est pas du tout étonnant, que les plus courageux

10 Joseph Hautière: op. cit.

11 Archives départementales du comitat Csongrád, protocole du conseil municipale, 2022/1793.

12 Archives départementales du comitat Csongrád, acte du conseil municipal, 1931/1793.

pouvaient s'évader sans trop de difficultés.¹³ En même temps, les appels des autorités adressés à la population pour dénoncer les évadés n'avaient aucun effet, car aucune initiative de la part de la population ne s'est pas manifestée en ce domaine, malgré le fait que le prime offert fut considérable, identique à celui des déserteurs de l'armée impériale.¹⁴

En ce qui concerne les difficultés de communication inévitables de ces prisonniers dans la région Sud-Est de la Hongrie, il faut le dire qu'elles étaient beaucoup moins importantes qu'on ne le croyait: durant la première moitié du dix-huitième siècle des colons étrangers avaient été installés en Hongrie pour repeupler la terre déserte, abandonnée par les turcs après cent-cinquante ans de domination de conséquences économiques particulièrement graves. Il y avait un bon nombre de français entre eux, qui, au moment de l'arrivée des prisonniers parlaient encore leur langue maternelle. Ainsi, par exemple dans le registre des baptêmes de la paroisse de Szeged on note vingt-deux noms français entre dix-sept-cent-cinquante et dix-sept-cent-soixante-quinze. (Les noms qui existent toujours à Szeged, comme "Le mont Français" - qui était couvert de vignes à l'époque, ou la rue Française gardent également le souvenir de ces colons venus de France.)¹⁵ En tout cas, il n'est pas du tout étonnant, qu'un officier, nommé Méconté parle dans son journal d'un ton enthousiasmé des belles demoiselles, qui, en partie, parlent français.¹⁶

Les autorités étaient préoccupées avant tout des rapports politiques éventuels des prisonniers: "vue de la variété de la population de la ville et la grande quantité de têtes folles et troublées qui se trouvent parmi les officiers français."¹⁷ En effet, il y avait une population très fortement "variée" dans cette région de

13 Archives départementales du comitat Csongrád, acte du conseil municipal, 2001/1793.

14 Archives départementales du comitat Csongrád, protocole du conseil municipal, 96/1794.

15 László Palásti: *Le mont Français, la vallée Française, la puszta (pays découvert) Française. Szeged, 1962.*

16 Zoltán Barcsay-Amant: op. cit. p. 89.

17 Ferenc Oltvai: *L'histoire de Szeged, d'après les souvenirs du passé (1222-1945). Szeged, 1968. pp. 87-88.*

Hongrie; on y trouve également des bulgares, des serbes, des grecs, des turcs et des allemands. Ce danger ne semblait pas du tout négligeable, vue que les prisonniers n'étaient pas coupés hermétiquement de leur pays d'origine: nous avons des témoignages de l'arrivée plus ou moins régulière des marchands venus des Pays-Bas et même de la France. Ces derniers étaient particulièrement suspects devant les autorités. Tout d'abord, parce que le commerce avec les provinces occupées par les français était interdit. D'autre part, parce que ces marchands pouvaient assurer le contact entre les prisonniers et leur patrie, ils étaient à la fois porteurs de marchandises, de lettres et d'informations jugées dangereuses.¹⁸

Nombreux sont les témoignages qui prouvent à quel point les autorités craignaient le rayonnement idéologique de la Révolution: les bagages des prisonniers devaient être fouillés et les livres suspects confisqués. Quelques uns des prisonniers ont rédigé leur journaux, ils ont retracé l'itinéraire du transport, avec les noms des localités, ils parlaient de leur distance, et bien sûr, ils décrivaient la vie quotidienne de leur captivité. Les autorités ont également confisqué ces documents, tout en assurant les autres, que si leurs notes n'étaient pas nuisible aux intérêts politiques de la monarchie, au moment de la libération, ils pourront les récupérer.¹⁹

Les autorités militaires ont très sévèrement contrôlé et censuré les lettres, la correspondance des soldats français. Il fallait d'abord présenter toutes les lettres au Conseil de Guerre de la Cour, pour pouvoir leur donner une suite favorable. En même temps il était sévèrement interdit à la population d'accepter et d'aider à transmettre les lettres des prisonniers français. Plusieurs fois des avertissements ont été lancés à la population "de ne point converser avec ces prisonniers."²⁰

Les sous-officiers et les simples soldats avaient très peu de liberté de mouvement. Ils ne pouvaient quitter leurs prisons pour aller en ville que pour faire des achats, et ceci sous escorte, ou bien à une occasion extraordinaire, par exemple à

18 Archives départementales du comitat Csongrád, protocole du conseil municipal, 1835/1794; 71/1795; 422/1795; 976/1795.

19 Archives départementales du comitat Csongrád, protocole du conseil municipal, 1745/1793.

20 Archives départementales du comitat Csongrád, protocole du conseil municipal, 2049/1793.

l'occasion des funérailles d'un camarade. Ces mesures sévères n'étaient pas l'employées vis-à-vis des officiers. Pour eux, prendre contact avec la population n'était pas interdit, mais ils devaient donner leur parole d'honneur de ne jamais parler de "leur propre constitutions" aux habitants, et de ne jamais quitter les limites de la ville.²¹ Pour assurer leur frais, les commandements militaires locaux versaient une certaine somme d'argent au prisonniers. Les officiers, les sous-officiers et les simples soldats devaient se débrouiller avec cet argent reçu: acheter leurs lits, leurs vaisselles etc., et ceci parce que le trésor royal voulait récupérer - au moins en partie - la pension versée au prisonniers français.²²

Par conséquent, entre les marchands locaux et les français une sorte de contact économique s'est établi et se stabilisait progressivement. Les intervention du Conseil de Guerre le prouvent, car il ne cessait pas de lancer les appels aux marchands locaux: pas de crédit aux prisonniers français! Ils doivent payer comptant, car les autorités, en aucun cas, ne se portent pas garant, et payeront pas les dettes des prisonniers français...²³ D'après les témoignages, la population s'intéressait surtout aux tissus et aux vêtements français. Étant donné que les officiers avaient des bagages relativement importants, ils ont répondu à cette demande du marché local en vendant leurs vêtements. A leur tour, les autorités, pour des raisons sanitaires, ont plusieurs fois attiré l'attention des habitants de la ville de s'abstenir "aux achats des vêtements français."²⁴ Il est à noter également, que ces rapports économiques avaient de temps en temps un aspect plutôt politisant: par exemple, sur les boutons de vêtement mis en vente par des officiers français, figuraient les mots "Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité". Les français avaient aussi l'habitude de faire cadeau aux habitants de cocardes, sûrement pas uniquement pour des raisons commerciales...

21 Archives départementales du comitat Csongrád, protocole du conseil municipal, 1775/1793; 1776/1793; 1326/1794.

22 Zoltán Barcsay-Amant: op. cit. pp. 78-83.

23 Archives départementales du comitat Csongrád, protocole du conseil municipal, 1877/1793; 1794/1793; 1835/1794.

24 Archives départementales du comitat Csongrád, protocole du conseil municipal, 1914/1793.

Pour conclure, nous insistons sur le fait que les prisonniers de guerre français étaient vraisemblablement les premiers à annoncer la Révolution à la population hongroise de la région, et - peut-être - les premiers à interpréter ses conséquences immédiates devant les habitants de ces grandes villes de la campagne hongroise et transylvaine.

C'est pour cette raison, que même les problèmes les plus insignifiants de ces prisonniers appartenèrent devant le Haut-Commandement militaire, et que leur sort intéressait tant l'empereur François II lui-même.

Les autorités, les représentants du régime ancien - s'ils ne savaient peut-être pas tout à fait clairement, ils pré-sentaient déjà sûrement que ces prisonniers possédaient quelque chose de particulièrement efficace et dangereux: l'esprit de quatre-vingt-neuf, qui pouvait être beaucoup plus dangereux pour eux que les armes, que ces français furent contraints de poser devant l'adversaire quelque part dans la région du Rhin.

A FRANCIA HADIFOGLYOK ÍRÁSAI MAGYARORSZÁGI HÉTKÖZNAPJAIKRÓL (1793-1794)

Nemcsak a magyar-francia kapcsolatok, hanem a nagy francia forradalom histórikumának is kissé elnagyolt és kissé elfelejtett fejezete a forradalmi háborúk első francia hadifoglyainak története.

1793 őszén - Günzburgnál behajózva - a Duna vízi útján indította Magyarország felé az első hadifogoly-szállítmányokat az osztrák katonai vezetés. Ezeknek az első fogolytáboroknak a színhelyét ugyanis Dél-Kelet-Magyarország és Erdély - a török veszély elmúltával katonai szempontból immár jelentéktelenné vált - várai és kaszárnyái kínálkoztak.

A legfelsőbb haditanács központi utasításai alapján igen jól lehet rekonstruálni a francia hadifoglyok hétköznapijait, melyet alapvetően két tényező befolyásolt. Egyrészt az egészségügyi, mentálhigiéniai helyzet, másrészt az a tény, hogy ezek az emberek a forradalmi Franciaország eszméitől "fertőzöttek", politikailag veszélyesnek minősülő elemként kerültek Magyarországra. A hatóságok számára mindkét kérdéskör komoly dilemmát jelentett. A skorbut, a diaré, a dizentéria, a sebláz folyamatosan szedte áldozatait. A tábori kórházak zsúfolásig megteltek. Nagy tüzek égetése és gyakori füstölések mutatták, hogy a beteg foglyokat befogadó városok lakossága járványtól tartott. Azt, hogy a hatóságok mennyire félték a forradalom szellemétől, számos központi utasítás, parancs bizonyítja. Így elrendelték: a hadifoglyok személyes dolgait alaposan át kell kutatni és meg kell nézni, hogy nem rejtegetnek-e tiltott könyvet. A lakosságot több alkalommal figyelmeztették: "ezen foglyokkal teljességgel ne társalkodgyanak". Dellard tábornok és Hautière kapitány följegyzései pedig mindezeket a hadifogoly szemével látatják, miközben mozaikszerűen felvillannak a korabeli magyar hétköznapiak is.

THE HUNGARIAN NATIONAL MINORITY IN YUGOSLAVIA
AFTER 1945¹
(A HISTORICAL SKETCH)

The almost stereotyped statement most frequently heard in connection with the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia is that compared to the other Central and Eastern European countries it is in Yugoslavia where the situation of the Hungarian minority is the most satisfactory considering both the constitutional and political arrangement and its realization in practice. In Hungarian journalism and official politics during the 1960s and 1970s the Yugoslavian policy towards national minorities was even described as something absolutely positive or at best as the example to be followed. On the other hand in the opinion of the general public in Hungary the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia - compared to the Hungarian minority in Romania and Czechoslovakia - always occupied - and still does - a particularly marginal place, combined with a latent but still continuously present guilty conscience because of the massacres in the South region (Novi Sad and Sajkas) in 1942.² These factors have covered up the major differences in the history of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia since the autumn of 1944 - I am speaking of the years 1944 and 1945 but I could also mention the period between 1945 and 1948 - and the reaction they have evoked is: "We'd better keep quiet."

Nevertheless it is a fact that the rights and established opportunities of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia are really better - have been made better -, but it is not a type of abstract ideal; we cannot even say so on the strength of their own opportunities and needs, it is only in a relative sense - compared with the much worse circumstances of the Hungarian minority in Romania, Czechoslovakia

1 This study is the extended version of the lecture given at the 1989 conference of the Protestant Academy for Hungarians in Europe.

2 Enikő A. Sajti: *Délvidék 1941-1944. A magyar kormányok délszláv politikája. [The South Region 1941-1944. The Southern Slav Policy of Hungarian Governments.]* Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1987 pp. 152-168.

and in Sub-Carpathia. On the other hand, to get a realistic picture of the possibilities of the preservation of their Hungarian identity it must be realized that they did not and still do not live in a sheltered place, independent of space and time, and that their history also has its constant and variable elements.

In the past 70 years there have been quite a few cases where one generation of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia has gone through more frequent changes of border and state, which in each case meant a fresh start. Falling from the position of a national majority into that of a minority always means a collective as well as individual trauma, a loss of social, cultural and national security, and a need to seek a way out. It implies a painful social amputation, and by virtue of logical necessity in most cases it means the loss of the intelligentsia and the middle class attached to the previous state.

This is what happened to the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia in the autumn and winter of 1944; compared to the border change in 1918 it was such a historical burden - because the above mentioned massacres - that the 500.000 Hungarians were within an inch of having the same fate as the German minority there and the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia. The policy of the "collectively guilty Hungarian minority" and the vengeance of "we'll pay you back for everything", the mass executions, the terrible atmosphere of the labour camps and the threats with deportation lasted only for a few months here. From the beginning of 1945 the situation eased considerably, still the effect of these things must not be neglected.³ But it would be a mistake to think that the postwar loyal attitude of the Hungarian minority was only due to the above mentioned retaliatory measures taken by the new power or that it could be attributed to a guilty conscience because of the years 1944/45. The structural composition of the Hungarian minority also pointed to a social revolution and the assertion of equal rights. We are talking about a minority society where - as modernization in Central and Eastern Europe was long-delayed and had its own peculiarities - only a modified and combined

3 Edvard Kardelj: *Sećanja. Borba za priznanje i nezavisnost nove Jugoslavije 1944-1957*. Beograd, 1980 p. 85.
Balogh Sándor: *A népi demokratikus Magyarország külpolitikája 1945-1947. [The Foreign Policy of the Hungarian People's Democracy. 1945-1947.]* Budapest, 1982 p. 36. Enikő A. Sajti: *ibid.* pp. 243-251.

form of the so called primary and secondary social restratification could take place. By primary social restratification in sociology they mean the breakup of the earlier agrarian structure and craft industry by capitalist industrial development; by secondary they mean the course of events after the development of large-scale industry. The bulk of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia were peasants - landless peasants and agricultural labourers, who were left out when the last distribution of land took place - and the structure of the working class in the middle of the 20th century was the type that had been long absent in Western Europe. The number of intellectuals drastically decreased, which I'll illustrate with one single figure; in Voivodina in 1945 there were only three secondary school teachers left who had a degree. Let alone the fact that the members of the Hungarian middle class fled almost without exception or became the victims of the retaliations. Even today about half of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia work in agriculture mostly as private smallholders; the ratio of blue-collar workers to white-collar workers is 82 to 18 as opposed to the national ratio of 70 to 30.⁴

In connection with ownership one thing must be mentioned: the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia is the only Central and Eastern European minority which in the sense of ownership has not been completely eliminated. About half of the Hungarians that work in agriculture are entrepreneurs.⁵

The literature on the question of national minorities agrees that not only the archaic social structure is a factor of the survival of a minority but also the structure of settlements i.e. whether the members of a minority live in relatively the same place or they are scattered in the given country.

In the northern part of the country 3/4 of the Hungarian minority live mostly along the Hungarian-Yugoslavian border in the Autonomous Territory of Voivodina, which is a multinational and not Hungarian autonomous territory. Here the

4 Varga László: *A jugoszláviai magyarság társadalmi, politikai helyzete. [The Social and Political Situation of the Hungarian National Minority in Yugoslavia.]* Híd 10-11/1970.

5 Arday Lajos: *A jugoszláviai magyar nemzetiség helyzete 1981. Jelentések a határokon túli magyar kisebbség helyzetéről. (Csehszlovákia, Szovjetunió, Románia, Jugoszlávia.) [The Situation of the Hungarian Minority in Yugoslavia. Reports on the Situation of Hungarian Minorities Abroad. (Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union, Romania, Yugoslavia)]* Medvetánc Könyvek, Budapest, 1988 p. 271.

Hungarians live rather closely together, while in Croatia and Slovenia they are in diaspora.. According to the findings of László Rehák in the 1960s a half of the 450.000 Hungarians in Voivodina lived in settlements where they were in the majority.⁶ However, there are some negative tendencies as well, which must be pointed out: ever since 1945 the absolute number of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia and their ratio in the whole population has been constantly decreasing. From 496.000 it has dropped to 427.000; their percentage in Voivodina has fallen from 25.8% to 18.9% in the whole of Yugoslavia from 3.1% to almost one half, 1.9%.⁷

Of course these negative tendencies are not unknown elsewhere either, however, in Yugoslavia the diminuation and ageing of the Hungarian minority - the Hungarian minority is the most aged in Yugoslavia - is counterpoised by the dynamic, almost explosion-like increase of the other non-Slavic minority, the Albanians. On the other hand, paradoxically, the factors that usually obstruct assimilation - a more archaic social structure, living in relatively the same place etc. - have under the peculiar Yugoslavian circumstances started to encourage assimilation and emigration. In the 1970s, when a great number of guest workers flooded to the west, as many Hungarians left Yugoslavia every year - 2000 - as the natural increase in their population. But even in proportion to their percentage in Voivodina the Hungarians were over-represented among the emigrants.⁸

There is an inverse ratio between the numerical proportion of Hungarians and the tolerance of the majority nationalities - Serbs, Croats, Slovenes. Where the Hungarian population is fewer - Slovenia, Croatia - the tolerance of the majority society is greater, there are more official gestures and also more successful results. Let me mention only a few typical facts: the special linguistic and cultural organisations of the Hungarian minority only exist in Slovenia and Croatia. (The

6 Rehák László: *Kisebbségtől a nemzetiségig. [From Minority to Nationality.]* Forum, Novi Sad, 1978 p. 202.

7 Arday Lajos: *ibid.* p. 268.

8 Mirnics Károly: *Demográfiai jellegzetességek a jugoszláviai magyar kisebbség életében. [Demographic Peculiarities in the Life of the Hungarian Minority in Yugoslavia.]* Híd, 1/1970 pp. 83-99.

Association of the Hungarians in Croatia and the Educational and Cultural Organisation of the Hungarian Minority) while the Republic of Serbia still does not see any reason for the existence of such vertical organisations, saying that any minority problem can be solved in the most natural way by the general political and social organisations, people's committees and self-governing bodies.

Obviously historical phenomena cannot be squeezed into mathematical formulae and strict correlations. This is also true for the matter of numerical proportion and tolerance, even if we know that unfortunately the law of numbers influences a country's policy towards national minorities. In our opinion in Serbia's case there is the consideration, or to be more precise, the fear that if the Hungarians living in the territory of the Republic formed organisations to safeguard their own interests, the Albanians would demand the same. However, this logic has long been outdated in history. Since 1981 the establishment of their own republic rather than the foundation of a kind of minority cultural organization has been in the centre of Albanian demands.

The following question has to be asked as well: what made it possible that after the tribulations of the beginning period of minority existence the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia gained promising cultural, constitutional and legal positions. What happened here - the number of institutions and constitutional opportunities increased and they got firmly established - was different from what happened in Romania, where under orders from above the conditions of culture and minority existence in general were quietly but deliberately and tenaciously phased out and then completely eliminated. Let me mention a few examples: an intellectual workshop for Hungarian studies - the first in Central and Eastern Europe after 1945 - was set up in Yugoslavia, namely the Institute of Hungarian Studies in Novi Sad (since the Hungarian Department and the Institute were united in 1976 it has been called Institute of Hungarian Linguistics, Literature and Hungarian Studies); but I could also mention the work done by Forum Publishing House and the publication of art and scientific journals and books in the town of Subotica.

In my opinion the causes of this can be found in the wider historical circumstances, in the changes that have taken place in Yugoslavian home policy and in the democratisation process, which Yugoslavian historians call the formation of a

self-governing society. Not wanting to spend much time on going into details about it I'll mention only one important fact: the reforms which were once introduced with the purpose of, and - it was believed - with the result of breaking up state-socialism resulted in spectacular though short-lasting economic development, increasing social consensus and the gradual fading away of false reactions towards the Hungarian minority. In 1959 it was officially expressed that minorities are "not only part of the country they originate from, but they are also attached to the country they live in, and the more guaranties there are for their legal equality and undisturbed development the stronger this attachment is".⁹ The above mentioned measures, the educational policy, the constitutional provisions of local statutes, the bilingual notices in the streets and so forth undoubtedly helped minorities feel more and more at home.

It is rightly asked whether it is still true today or whether it was only true in the long bygone days of economic development and social consensus. The question is all the more right because there are two categories that history surely does not know: the euphemistic expressions of "for ever" and "never".

The question can be put differently: what is the effect of the crisis - indicated by the nearly 1500% rate of inflation, demonstrations, counterdemonstrations and nationalities opposed to one another - on the opportunity for the Hungarian minority to survive?

Before trying to answer the question, we must make a few notes about the nature of the Yugoslavian crisis, the roots of which can be found in the 1960s and 1970s.

The economic reform in 1963, the constitutional reform in 1974 and the associated labour law in 1976 served a double purpose: it was believed that by destroying the federation i.e. the central ownership of the Yugoslavian state and by the introduction of the market economy it was possible to prevent the revival of both state chauvinism - behind which even today we can see the nationalism of the Serbs - and republican separatism. While, however, the economic reform of

⁹ Rehák László: *Nemzet, nemzetiség, kisebbség Jugoszláviában.* [Nation, Nationality and Minority in Yugoslavia.] Gondolat, Budapest 1988 p. 45.

the 1960s was stopped, the reform of the federation, i.e. its decentralisation, was carried out within the scope of the unchanged one-party system. As a result the situation in Yugoslavia became unique: the central role of the federal institutions was taken over by the republics; and the control of the economy* and politics became the monopoly of the party hierarchy of the republics. So the fight began "for the best seat at the dinner where the corps of the federation was served up" - as a Yugoslavian historian wittily observed.¹⁰ From the single-centered party-state the multi-centered state of Yugoslavia was born, however, the republics themselves maintained the characteristics of centralized and bureaucratic state socialism. There was a craze of investment due to foreign loans, the biggest in Yugoslavian history, which were supposed to legitimize the new leadership of the republics rather than make a profit. However, as a result of the associated labour law the financial resources were divided among 600.000 organisations (OOUR), were frittered away, and so were not enough for the necessary big investments such as roads, oil refineries, electric power stations. The public kept quiet, the standard of living of almost all social strata became higher - redundant workers flowed to the western countries.

At the turn of the 1970s and 1980s - Tito was already seriously ill - there were two political tendencies waiting with their guns at their feet: those who were against centralism because they got the defeated federation as a sacrificial lamb and the followers of the strong-arm policy who were given the heads of the Croatian and Albanian "nationalists". Although after Tito's death it was possible to make a painless transition without heavy fighting for power, this silence, it is now clear, was only the lull before the storm.

The problems in Kosovo shocked the public: the state, which was taken by surprise, reacted to the problems with drastic measures, and so the appearance of Serbian nationalism, hurt and seemingly forced to be on the defensive and the

10 Dušan Bilandžić: *Jugoslavia posle Tita. 1980-1985*. Zagreb, 1986 p. 35.

withdrawn but more and more clamorous Albanian national movement was not surprising.¹¹

The first reaction of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia to the crisis was fear. The fear was that the crisis by virtue of its nature would destroy their establishments. (Recently the intellectuals in Voivodina had to protest against the closure of a secondary school.) There is no definite answer to the question when and how Serbian nationalism, which has so far been occupied with the crisis in Kosovo, will expanded towards the north, in the direction of Voivodina. It is also known that the changing picture of an enemy is not alien from nationalism, i.e. when one concrete "enemy" - more precisely the Albanian minority labelled as an enemy - is suddenly transformed into the picture of the enemy as minorities in general.

The most important question, of course, is: are the rival powers of Yugoslavian political life going to put the Hungarian minority in the stocks again, or on the contrary, is there going to be a new synthesis born from the chaos of the crisis and the decline of the traditional forms of the survival of minorities?

The Kosovo crisis is examined in detail by Branko Horvat: *Kosovsko pitanje*. Zagreb, 1988; Batric Jovanović: *Kosovo. Inflacija, socijalne razlike*. Beograd, 1984. About crisis in general: Branko Horvat: *Jugoslavenska privreda 1965-1983*. Zagreb, 1984; by the same author: *Jugoslavensko društvo u krizi*. Zagreb, 1985; Mijalko Todorović: *Političko biće društvene krize*. Zagreb, 1986.

A JUGOSZLÁVIAI MAGYAROK 1945 UTÁN (TÖRTÉNELMI VÁZLAT)

A tanulmány a jugoszláviai magyar kisebbség 1945 utáni helyzetét elemzi. Röviden felvázolja társadalmi szerkezetüket, főbb demográfiai adataikat, majd utal a többségi nemzetek magyarokkal kapcsolatos politikájának mozgatórugóira. A továbbiakban arra keresi a választ, hogy e kisebbség jogai, önmegőrzésének intézményes keretei miért alakultak kedvezőbben az 1944-1945-ös mélypont ellenére is, mint a romániai, kárpát-aljai és a csehszlovákiai magyarságé. Az okokat a jugoszláviai magyar kisebbséget körülvevő tágabb történeti közegben, Jugoszlávia belpolitikai életében, az 50-es, 60-as évektől kibontakozó változásokban jelöli meg. Ezek elemzése után megállapítja: az államszocializmus széttrésésének céljával bevezetett - s a szerző szerint ebből a szempontból csekély eredményt hozó - reformok rövid ideig látványos gazdasági felfutást, erősödő társadalmi konszenzust és a magyarsággal szembeni hamis reflexek elhalványulását, a kulturális, alkotmányos, jogi lehetőségek bővülését jelentették.

A 60-as, 70-es évek reformjai azonban negatív tendenciákat is magukban hordoztak: a központi, föderatív intézmények etatista szerepét átvették a köztársaságok, s az egyközpontú pártállamból megszületett a policentrikus etatista Jugoszlávia. A 80-as évek elején kirobbanó koszovói válságra az állam durva eszközökkel reagált, s a társadalom porondján megjelent a sértett, látszólag védekezésbe szorított szerb nacionalizmus. A jugoszláviai magyarság első reakciója e válságra a félelem érzése volt. Attól tartottak, hogy a válság elindíthatja eddig kiépített intézményrendszerük erózióját, s a szerb nacionalizmus a Vajdaság irányába is eszkalálódik. A kérdések kérdése ma az - írja tanulmánya befejező részében a szerző -, hogy a jugoszláv politikai életben egymással versengő erők vajon újabb kalodába szorítják-e az ottani magyarságot, avagy ellenkezőleg, a válság zűrzavarából és a kisépek hagyományos önmegőrző formáinak felbomlásából új szintézis születik-e?

LAJOS PÁNDI

PORTUGAL, 1974: FALL OF THE COLONIAL DICTATORSHIP

1. Taking over of power

By the turn of 1973-74, the policy of the government in Portugal came to a deadlock, mainly because of the hopeless colonial wars.¹ Although the more and more frequent actions of mass demonstrations and resistance movements did not shake the state apparatus, they did increase its inner tension, thus advancing the crystallization of a power change that developed from within the repressive organization itself, the colonial army.

During the war, especially from 1968, the social composition and stratification characteristic of the body of officers changed (it consisted increasingly of modern middle-class citizens, thus a new military intellectual-class took shape), its ideological and later its political foundations were shaken: they realized the hopelessness of victory. The lack of a government policy promising military victory, and a decrease in the professional level and prestige of the army were joined by a threatening prospect of an unjust calling to account. The inflexibility of the government - renewing the tradition of *pronunciamento* - developed the idea of the necessity of an interference in politics.

A representative of one of the political trends of the army, general António de Spínola, the "unlikeliest liberal", became the vice-chief of general staff and the deputy-chief of Costa Gomes after a long colonial service, in January, 1974. In the spring of 1972, as a Guinean commander-in-chief, he had summed up his position

1 This essay forms part of dissertation of a candidacy (Debrecen, 1985) titled *Social-political fights in Portugal, 1961-1976 (A study of case of the allied bloc of power)*. Regarding antecedents see the following works of the author: *Years of Salazar-dictatorship (1926-1961)*; *Portugal, 1968: Stabilization or development? (Historical addition to quandary of reform)*; *Antifascist resistance and the colonial question in Portugal (1961-1974)*. These works were published in the following periodicals: *Századok* (Budapest) 1987/6 (pp. 1061-1100); *Világtörténet* (Budapest) 1986/3-4 (pp. 120-144); *Acta Universitatis Szegediensis de Attila József Nominata. Sectio Scientiae Socialismi* (Szeged) T. XXII. 1987 (pp. 177-209).

in the statement: "This war can not be won in Guinea, but can be lost in Lisbon".² His conception, which he outlined in his book titled *Portugal And Its Future* (February, 1974), promised federation to the liberation movements in return for finishing the war, and thus his policy differed from that of the prime minister, Marcelo Caetano (although he agreed with the bridging of the "African" and the "European" interest groups of the ruling classes of the motherland).

In Spinola-ism, the fighting army itself turned against the war. This "liberalized" colonialism had a chance of success only by relying on an untouched bureaucracy and repressive organization, namely: the "strong democracy" of a conservative presidential regime.

After President of the Republic Spinola's aspirations had failed at the 1972 elections, and after he had tried in vain to put pressure on the political leadership in the spirit of the following slogan: "The army is not the pretorian guard of power", he was dismissed together with his supporters (in March, 1974). It became clear that he could not change the politics of the government in a legal way. Nevertheless there was an urgent need for change, so as to prevent the forming orthodox Salazarist turn and a possible explosion coming from the lower ranks. It also became clear that - as military-political factions of privileged groups were paralysing one another - the "generals" could only achieve the subversion of the government with the help of an illegal movement of the "captains" (middle-ranks officers who were in the centre of military charges such as Vasco Gonçalves, Melo Antunes and Saraiva de Carvalho).

A political organization, the CAPTAINS' MOVEMENT, had been developing in the army since the autumn of 1973. Its purpose was the establishment of a democratic regime for a peaceful settlement of the colonial question (in the spirit of the admission of the peoples' principle of self-determination) and the retrieving of lost military prestige. According to their starting-point: "it was impossible to achieve

2 Rodrigues, A. - Borgia, C. - Cardoso, M.: *O Movimento dos Capitães e o 25 de Abril - 229 dias para derrubar o fascismo*. Lisboa: Morães, 1974. p. 245.

aims forced on them by a power that denies the fact that it lacks the suitable means of implementing its politics."³

This new movement was crystallized by March, 1974 as The ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT (Movimento das Forças Armadas - MFA). The movement wanted to subvert the power, out as they were shattered by the dismissals in March, they were forced to search for allies, which they finally found: the Spínola-ists. Spínola could guarantee the alliance or neutrality of the society and the army, especially the apolitical majority of the colonial body of officers; the external and internal capitalist groups (first of all the greatest Champalimaud-group supporting him directly); the Great Powers and the international organizations involved (NATO above all); and the Catholic Church.

According to the "PROGRAM OF THE MFA", the compromised platform of the above trends,⁴ even "after thirteen years of fighting overseas, the existing political system has not succeeded in defining a concrete and objective overseas policy that leads to peace among Portuguese of all races and beliefs". Therefore, settling a peace strategy opposed to the government which lost its legitimacy "was possible only after the purging of the present internal policies and its institutions, and transforming them to be real representatives of the Portuguese people in a democratic way".

The program set forth that "the solution for the overseas war must be a political and not a military one", that an open and national debate was needed about the colonial question, and that an "overseas policy leading to peace" should be established therein.⁵ A Spínola-ist inspired passage, that the present power "must acknowledge its international obligations arising from contracts in force", purposed to calm the international environment.⁶

3 Orlando Neves (org. e introd.): *Textos históricos da Revolução*. Vol. I. Lisboa: Diábril, 1975. p. 16.

4 Ibid. p. 41.

5 Ibid. p. 45.

6 Ibid.

Behind the alliance of the "liberalising" conservative Spinola-ists and the revolutionary-democrat "Captains", stood the compromise of the modern finance-oligarchy, the radicalized petty bourgeoisie, which covered the domestically oriented (middle-) bourgeoisie, and the working class, also. The external economic and political groups, attached to the alliance by the monopol groups, accepted the fall of the Salazarist regime, but needed a two to three year transition period in the colonies and Portuguese protection so as to preserve their positions. This could be guaranteed by Spinola's conservative presidential regime.

The organizers and precise executors of the taking over of power, prepared in the above way, were the "captains": the Political Coordinating Committee (CCP) ruled by colonel Vasco Gonçalves and the military centre directed by major Saraiva de Carvalho. The military action starting at the dawn of 25th April subverted the authoritarian dictatorship of Caetano within the same day.

31% of the "captains", 14% of the headquarters of the Portuguese military units, and hardly 5% of the whole army participated actively in the action, and this fact shows the frailty of the victory and thus the significance of the preliminary alliance. Half of the military forces was "politically amorphous", while the 45% who were damaged in their interests were neutralized at the moment.⁷

The "palace revolution" appearance of the taking over of power, its bloodlessness and rapidity, was thus the condition of victory. However, it became the source of later problems: the smashing of the repressive organization and the shattering of the bureaucracy did not happen; it created the illusion of a national unity delaying the clarification of fronts; the purge of the new power did not happen; and it did not help to overcome the weakness of the democratic resistance movement, either.

According to the earlier compromise, with the participation of Spinola and six of his fellow generals, a new summit organization was founded: the JUNTA OF NATIONAL SALVATION (Junta de Salvação Nacional - JSN).

⁷ Diniz de Almeida, E.: *Ascensão, apogeu e queda do MFA*. Vol I. Lisboa: Sociais, 1978. p. 15.

During the political "wildcat scheme craze", after the taking over of power, and until the government came into office 54, and by July some 80, organizations were established which can be regarded as parties. The well-organized powers of the opposition, having cadres, a program and experience, came to light at once with great force. The mass movement, which started in earlier months and was peaking now, corresponded in several points to the trends of the PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY (PCP), the PORTUGUESE SOCIALIST PARTY (PS), the INTERSINDICAL oppositional trade union centre, the parties of the extreme left and the "captains". Their mutual pressure made the program, and especially the Spínola-ist conception, antiquated even in the first days (a purge by the lower ranks, *de facto* activity of parties, *de jure* acknowledgement of trade unions, dismissal of the Corporative Chamber, amnesty for deserters, dismissal of the legislature of Mozambique and Guinea etc.).

Limitation of the change to a conservative presidential system had already been frustrated by this time: besides the stepping up of the army, the euphoric atmosphere also blocked the repressive organization, paralyzed the central and local bureaucracy, and the made the right-wing (which had lost its political support because of the utter powerlessness of the Salazarist state) withdraw. This *Aliança Povo-MFA* ('people-MFA alliance'), the *de facto* alliance between the "captains" and the civil left-wing, created the possibility of the development of a revolutionary process. From this stage, the relationship between the monopol power and democratic human rights became a direct problem of the change from dictatorship to democracy.

In spite of a lack of organization, Caetano's earlier "young liberalists" appeared as a significant force. The group of the POPULAR DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PPD), forming now with the leadership of Sá Carneiro, was the inheritor of the "liberal wing" of the National Assembly elected in 1969.

After three weeks, the constitutional law No. 3/74 of 14th May outlined the provisional political system of Portugal. Consequently,⁸ for the planned one year

8 Orlando Neves op. cit. pp. 56-66.

before the election of a Constituent National Assembly, a power took shape which was highly separated in its institutions.

Spínola, who came to office as provisional President of the Republic on 15th May, was the president of JSN and the Council of State and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He elected or dismissed the government (which was responsible only towards him), he took care of constitutionalism and announced laws and orders. Regarding constitutional law, he was only responsible "towards the nation" and could effectively be limited by the JSN. The position became the centre of power of Spínola-ists. The right of appointment of military leaders was given to the authority of the JSN, thus the armed forces were made independent from the government (that is, from the civil power). In this, Chief of General Staff Costa Gomes was equal with the Prime Minister.

In the civil provisional government, which came into office on May 16th and had limited authority, the MFA forced a wide alliance which earlier could not have been established by the powers of the opposition. The consensus referred to the Constituent National Assembly. "Free elections to the Constituent National Assembly will be enormously significant - as the first proclamation of the communist party stated after the turn - and this will open the process of the democratic change of the Portuguese society. This purpose must not be distorted on any pretext."⁹ Two labour parties also participated in the liberalist and social-democratic dominated government (Mário Soares socialist party leader became Foreign Secretary and Álvaro Cunhal communist party leader became a minister without portfolio).

The consultative and constituent COUNCIL OF STATE, which had crystallized by the end of May, became the only institution of power in which the anonymous "captains" were represented - therefore it became the main field of political battles. Besides the seven members each of CCP and JSN (the two de facto centres of power), seven more members were appointed by Spínola, so that a conservative-liberal hegemony prevailed in the Council of State.

⁹ Documentos do CC do PCP (Abril - Dezembro de 1974). Lisboa: Avante, 1975. pp. 18-19.

However the "captains" possessed a considerable real power: they disposed directly of the dominant military units, tried to control every important institution of power, they could count on the support of the left-wing, as well as the labour of large-scale industry, the modern middle-class citizens, the soldiers, and the southern agricultural proletariat (which meant an active mass base). Though the revolution was definitely that of the capital at its beginning, as the country masses did not move in the first few months.

The pillar of the institutional power was set up by military groups represented by Spínola, monopolies represented by economic co-ordinating minister Vieira de Almeida and the block of centrist powers (and the right-wing behind them) led by Sá Carneiro. Its content was determined by the alliance of the ruling class and popular classes with the dominance of the former one.

This formula of power had limited the purpose of the big bourgeoisie in advance, opening a way towards a quicker and wider capitalist modernization (by relieving the country of the dead weight of the colonial war and the corporate mechanism). The proceeding wage-demands questioned the competitiveness based on a cheap labour force. The democratic claims jeopardized the political power of capital, the decolonizational trends imperiled its economic position in Africa. The big-bourgeoisie could rely neither on a repressive organization, nor on a party policy structure.

2. Failure of the "liberalized" colonialism

The solution of the problem initially followed a line in compliance with the constitution of power, in the spirit of Spínola-ism which purposed to restore the "climate of institutionalized legitimacy".

The time-table for settling the colonial question was the following¹⁰ (with the exception of Macau and Timor):

1. armistice, in return for which Portugal promised to acknowledge the principle of self-determination;

10. Ruas, H. B. (coord.): *A Revolução das Flores*. Vol. I. Lisboa: Aster, 1974. pp. 294, 305-6.

2. the quickened development of colonies, the establishment of democratic institutions;
3. a plebiscite with alternatives of federation, confederation or independence;
4. "independence" within the scope of a federation.

However Spínola's conception, as outlined in his book in February, immediately encountered the resistance of the liberation movements, for whom April 25th opened an unexpected prospect of quick independence. Their relation to the Spínola-ist time-table was therefore well defined: "we are concerned in the changing of Portugal's regime to the extent to which the new government acknowledges our people's right to a complete independence" - declared the MOZAMBIQUE LIBERATION FRONT (FRELIMO), for example.¹¹ So Portugal was compelled to contact fighting movements, and by the middle of June, the viewpoints of the negotiating parties became rigid: while Portugal acknowledged the principle of self-determination (which not involved independence) only on the stipulation of previous armistice; the liberation movements made armistice (regarded as merely a practical question) depend on the previous acknowledgement of the principle of self-determination (in the sense of independence) of the colony ruled exclusively by them.

Portugal then decided to force the armistice on the liberation movements by military means. Recruits were called in, more than ever, and yet, the liberation movements had greater successes than ever before: the AFRICAN PARTY FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF GUINEA AND CAPE VERDE (PAIGC) went on besieging surrounded towns, the FRELIMO started surrounding towns in Central Mozambique and the divided PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (MPLA) was also able to gain victories.

By continuing the war Portugal encountered insurmountable difficulties: even the colonial troops themselves were against it. After negotiations had been broken off between Portugal and FRELIMO in Lusaka, the Portuguese officers in Mozambique demanded an end to the war in a meeting, then the "captains" directly

¹¹ O processo revolucionário de guerra popular de libertação. Collecção textos e documentos da FRELIMO. Maputo: *Departamento do Trabalho da FRELIMO*, 1977. p. 197.

contacted the FRELIMO. In Bissau, more than a thousand officers and soldiers of the colonial army "set up a claim for the Portuguese government's acknowledgement of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and the right of the people of Cape Verde Islands to self-determination and independence, the only political step which would lead to a real peace."¹² Then the "captains" also directly contacted the PAIGC.

Similar temptations took shape concerning other questions as well (pay-raises and strikes, a purge of the state apparatus, the mass media and the army, as well as an assertion of military hierarchy against "captains" etc.). Thus a stalemate developed by the beginning of July: the formal decision was in the hands of the Spínola-ists, however, the means of execution was held by the "captains" and their allies, so the talks between the two parties were interrupted when the colonial question became rigid in June. They could not go further according to the original compromise unless the power relations could be changed, but this required settling the matter of quandary: whether to acknowledge the independence or to continue the war.

Spínola-ists, who now were compelled to take steps, started with the ultimatum of Prime Minister Palma Carlos. According to the proposal¹³ of the beginning of July, which formally proposed to modify the No. 3/74 law, the President of the Republic would be elected within three months, and at the same time a provisional constitution would be accepted, the elections to the Constituent National Assembly would be delayed till November, 1976, and the authority of the government would be increased for the sake of disposing power. The ultimatum can be regarded as an attempted constitutional putsch with the goal of establishing a conservative Spínola-ist presidential regime, as:

1. at the presidential elections, Spínola - with his probable victory - could have gained a legitimacy independent from the movements of the "captains";

12 Porch, D.: *The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution*. London: Croom Helm, 1977. p. 114.

13 Rodrigues, A. - Borgia, C. - Cardoso, M.: *Portugal depois de Abril*. Lisboa: Intervoz, 1976. p. 40.; Kuntz, J.: *Les fusils et les urnes: le Portugal aujourd'hui*. Paris: Denoel, 1975. p. 27.

2. with the delay of the elections to the Constituent National Assembly, right-wing parties could have gained more time for consolidation;
3. and the "captains" position would have been shattered by subordinating military forces to the government.

The proposal was dismissed by organs of power for different reasons, and in return the prime minister and his supporters abdicated. During the cabinet crisis, the subject of the debate on the surface was the person of the new prime minister, and the decision was enforced by military troops of the capital, directed by the "captains". The formal novelty of the second provisional government, coming to office on 17th July with the leadership of Vasco Gonçalves, was that the "captains" undertook a direct political role; the government essentially became social-democrat dominated at the expense of the Spínola-ists.

As an other important step, the "captains" military centre was legalized as OPERATION COMMAND FOR THE CONTINENT (COPCON), setting the maintenance of public order "in the spirit of 25th April" as a task, with a covert hint of being against police and gendarme forces. Its leader, Sarajva de Carvalho, became commander of the military district of Lisbon at the same time, so that the "captains" formal influence in military forces and political life suddenly increased.

With the solution of the crisis of July, the balance of power changed within the initial alliance: the Spínola-ists lost ground. These the two opposed centres of power now became the President of the Republic (JSN) and the government (CCP). The position of Costa Gomes, who balanced and negotiated between them, was upgraded.

The constitutional law, No. 7/74 of July 26th, which "better defined" the original program, was a decisive consequence of the changed balance of power and the most important political step in 20th century Portugal. "The principal, which considers the solution of overseas wars politically and not militarily, called forth Portugal's acknowledgement of the principle of people's self-determination", that the law expressed. On the other hand it undertook the main demand of, the liberation movements: "Acknowledging the principle of self-determination, with all

of its consequences, including the acceptance of the independence of overseas territories."¹⁴

After the crisis of July, the emphasis within the finance-oligarchy was placed, by the supporters of federation, on those who agreed with some form of "neocolonist" solution. With the decolonizational law, Spínola's function, in which he transgressed the limits of his original position, was the assurance of this solution. It stipulated the driving back of popular forces, especially the "captains'" movement, in the motherland, and the liberation movements in the colonies. The organization of a "Spinola-ist bloc" of conservative-reactionary forces and a kind of "third power" in the colonies began accordingly.

The moderate conservatives made a successful attempt at this in the long run: as a member of the European Christian-democratic Union, the CENTRE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (CDS) evolved from Caetano's technocrats and from groups of bourgeoisie, becoming conservative now, under the leadership of Freitas do Amaral, in July. This party fundamentally represented a continuity of marcelism, under the changed circumstances.

Problems of the forming "Spinola-ist bloc" were however of great significance:

1. clergy (who were influential even after April 25th) and monarchists could not be won over;
2. internal conflicts within the ultras and the aloofness of moderate CDS indicated that they were divided;
3. the radical fuglemen were the compromised elements of the old regime;
4. Spinola as "supraparty representative of the nation" did not wish his person and position to enter into the service of political purposes (though he would have been glad to be a "silent partner" in a succesful political power again). The inherited state apparatus, lead now by Spinola, remained the hope of the bourgeoisie.

After the decolonization law, it still remained an open question, who should practice self-determination in the name of "peoples of the colonies" and how. Spinola had to centralize decolonization in his own hands so as to drive back liberation movements for the benefit of a "third power" and in order to enforce

14 Ruas, H. B. (coord.): *A Revolução das Flores* Vol. III. Lisboa: Aster, 1974. p. 67.

the referendum. "It is the task of the President of the Republic to sign agreements concerning the practice of rights acknowledged in previous clauses after hearing out the JSN, the Council of State and the provisional government", he inserted in the law after a one-week delay.¹⁵

In Guinea, which was considered a touchstone (where armed struggle had been decided long ago in favour of the PAIGC), Portugal, according to the agreement¹⁶ signed on August 26th, acknowledged Guinea-Bissau as an independent state and the right to independence of the peoples of Cape Verde Islands on September 10th, 1974.

There was no need for a "third power" in Angola: antagonism among three rival movements became the main obstacle to quick decolonization. After the inner turn of MPLA could not be enforced, Spínola decided to take a step which was extreme even from the standpoint of his own program: he signed a secret agreement with President of Zaire Mobutu, on September 14th. In compliance¹⁷ with it, Spínola supported the NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF ANGOLA (FNLA) against the MPLA, he surrendered Cabinda to a small separatist movement supported by Zaire, and he supported the establishment of a "federal republic" including Zaire, Angola and Cabinda under the presidency of Mobutu and the vice-presidency of Holden Roberto, leader of the FNLA. In return, Mobutu guaranteed a twenty year exclusive right of Portuguese monopolies to exploit resources of the "federal republic", gained support in Africa for Spínola's "decolonizational" plan and helped win Guinea and Mozambique back in every way.

With significant concessions, the agreement attracted Portuguese bourgeoisie with huge economic potential. For its execution, however, there was a need to militarily drive-back the MPLA, but the colonial army was not willing to fight

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Orlando Neves op. cit. pp. 205-206.

¹⁷ Diniz de Almeida op. cit. p. 158.; Porch op. cit. pp. 116-117.

here, either. A meeting of five hundred Portuguese officers in Angola, on September 18th, brought a decision to end the war.¹⁸

Mozambique directly endangered the Spinoal-ist plan: as a viable "third power" could not be joined together, an agreement of independence was signed in Lusaka, on September 7th. Accordingly,¹⁹ until the date of independence, June 25th, 1975, in the intermediate period Portugal and FRELIMO together guaranteed the process of the taking over of power.

At the moment of signing the agreement, a revolt of settlers broke out in Lourenço Marques and spread over to Beira as well. Rebels rejected the agreement of Lusaka, which had been signed without them, and they tried to negotiate with Portugal on the basis of a referendum. However, under the pressure from the "captains", the government of Portugal described the revolt as high-treason and the colonial army was mobilized against it. As a reaction, white settler ultras unilaterally announced the independence of Mozambique (which they had been planning since 1972). Although their hopes (support of Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia as well as the change-over of Portuguese troops) did not materialize, and the rebellion was suppressed.

The basis for the open political appearance of Spinoal-ist forces was given by Spinoal himself in his speech at acknowledging Guinea-Bissau on September 10th. "Decolonization", he interpreted the basic task again, "opposed to certain people's naive ideas, should not consist in a mere transfer of power to the party organization that sustained the armed struggle against the former Portuguese regime".²⁰ For the sake of the "authentic democracy", he appealed to the "silent majority": "the silent majority of the Portuguese nation must wake up at last to defend itself against extremist totalitarians".²¹

18 Diniz de Almeida op. cit. pp. 156-157.

19 Orlando Neves op. cit. pp. 207-212.

20 Spinoal, A. de: *Ao serviço de Portugal*. Lisboa: *Atica-Livraria Bertrand*, 1976. p. 175.

21 Ibid. p. 179.

Using the speech as a program, the radical right-wing organized a protest of the "silent majority" in the capital by September 28th. PPD and CDS joined, and they found active supporters among some members of JSN and the government. The protest was primarily financed by the monopol group Espirito Santo, while the mass media was also mobilized so as to influence public opinion.

The substance of the plan²² was to introduce a military personal dictatorship (on the basis of an extraordinary situation), because of planned riots occurring during the protest, behind the back of the failing compromise between the bourgeoisie and the popular classes, and relying on the "will" of the traditional middle-classes.

The civil (and military) "silent majority" of the society was still in a prepolitical situation, and was neutralized because Spínola's dictatorship would have meant a continuation of the war. So the crisis of September 27-28th was not solved within the scope of the clash of traditional middle-classes and the modern rank of wage-earners (as it was to one year later), but the struggle was fought in their names between the organized, civil right- and left-wing, and reflected in the conflicts of political and military leaders.

The trial failed because of joining together of Costa Gomes, who held a key-position, and COPCON.²³ As a result, conservative and liberal forces were all the more driven back in the third provisional government, also lead by Gonçalves, the JSN was purged, and the Spínola-ists were driven out of the MFA. In the place of Spínola, who was compelled to abdicate, General Francisco da Costa Gomes became the new provisional President of the Republic (simultaneously president of the JSN), which fact meant a return to the original conception of the "captains". In his installation speech²⁴ of September 30th, he supported pluralist democracy as the only means "which can guarantee a field for creating real dimensions of human dignity"; promised to continue decolonization; acknowledged international

22 Branco Livro. *28 de Setembro*. Lisboa: *Avante*, 1975. p. 62.; Orlando Neves op. cit. p. 61.

23 Saraiva de Carvalho, O.: *Cinco meses mudaram Portugal*. Lisboa: Portugal, 1975. pp. 23-24.

24 Orlando Neves op. cit. pp. 151-152.

duties, NATO membership among them; and promised to uphold the principle of peaceful coexistence. His role showed the efforts of weak, domestically oriented bourgeoisie to carry out its interests, already under the hegemony of popular forces.

With the turn of the end of September, the conception, which was based on the absolute power of Spínola's conservative presidency failed, and the class-alliance of April disintegrated. The new power no longer represented the interests (concerning first of all - but not only - the colonies) of federative and "neocolonialist" factions of the modern big bourgeoisie (who were united with foreign capital groups).

The outline of the program of renewed power went back to the original conception of CAPTAINS' MOVEMENT, composing it again in the spirit of the slogan of the "three D-s" (*descolonização, democratização, desenvolvimento*) that hall-marked Portuguese revolution.

PORTUGÁLIA 1974: A KOLONIALISTA DIKTATÚRA BUKÁSA

Marcelo Caetanónak a gyarmati háborúk miatt zsákutcába jutott kormánypolitikája ellenében a hadsereg két politikai áramlata kristályosodott ki. Spinola tábornok az uralkodó csoportok képviselőjeként egy konzervatív elnöki rendszer keretében föderációt ígért a háború befejezése fejében. A "kapitányok" mozgalma (MFA) mint a népi osztályok képviselője egy demokratikus rendszer keretében a gyarmati népek önrendelkezését ígerte a békés rendezés érdekében.

A rendszer megdöntésére szövetkezett két áramlat kompromisszumos platformja az alkotmányozó nemzetgyűlési választásig tartó egy éves átmeneti időszakban a demokratikus átalakulást és a gyarmati kérdés politikai rendezését tűzte célul.

Miután az MFA irányította katonai akció 1974. április 25-én megdöntötte Caetano rendszerét, Spinola ideiglenes köztársasági elnök "liberalizált" kolonializmusa szellemében indult meg a feladatmegoldás. Ez a felszabadító mozgalmak katonai ellenállásába ütközött, s a háború folytatásával szembeszegült az MFA befolyásolta gyarmati hadsereg, a baloldali pártok és a tömegmozgalom.

A pathhelyzetet a júliusi politikai válság kimenetele oldotta fel: az induló szövetségben a spinolisták rovására teret nyert az MFA. A hatalomeltolódás következményeként július 26-án Portugália deklarálta a gyarmatok függetlensége értelmében vett dekolonizációt.

A spinolisták ekkor megkísérelték "harmadik erők" kezére játszani a gyarmatokat, feltételeként pedig az MFA-t kiszorítani a hatalomból. A "csendes többség" elnöki diktatúrát célzó szeptember 28-i megmozdulásának elvetélését azonban Spinola bukása követte. Ezzel felbomlott az uralkodó és a népi osztályok áprilisi szövetsége.2:

GYÖRGY KUKOVECZ

THE CHURCH AND THE SOCIAL CHALLENGES IN MODERN CUBA

Christian tradition being a characteristic basic feature of Cuban culture, the more startling the fact is that Cuba is the only Latin-American country of our day where Christmas is not a holiday. In 1969 the greatest feast of Christianity was expelled from the official holiday calendar on state initiatives with the involuntary consent of Church leaders. Although not disappearing from Cuban society Christmas retired to private life in family houses and among church walls.

The government justified the ban and the feast's subsequent shift to New Year by referring to the vital importance of unbroken continuity of work during the *zafra*, the sugar-producing period of the year. The national campaign for achieving 10 million tons of sugar per year went on in the late 60ies. The lack of any considerable opposition in society against expelling Christmas and pressing it back to private life throws a characteristical light on the artificially heightened producing-enthusiasm of the time and on Cuban religiousness as well.

Perhaps the story of Cuban Christmas can have a symbolic meaning just because it contains these references to the anomalies of Cuban religiousness. It mirrors equally the weakness and marginal position of the Church and the indifference or at least an aversion to institutionalized religion on the side of the population.

Experts agree that today Cuba is the least religious country in Latin-America; a country where the Churches including Roman Catholicism with her vast historical tradition have only a modest social influence.

Opinion prevails that this is the direct consequence of the 1959 revolution: Castro's church policy with the dominancy of Marxism and the official ideology of atheism have been responsible and can be blamed for the marginal position of the Church. This explanation seems to be evident, is nicely rounded and even gives opportunity to draw East-European parallels but a deeper insight into the history

of Cuban Catholicism reveals its incompleteness.

The Church had been losing ground in Cuban society long before the Revolution, as early as the period of national awakening and fighting for independence in the second half of the 19th century. From the very beginning the social challenges of 20th century Cuba proved to be unanswerable or only partly answerable for the Roman Catholic Church. The history slowly building up of these answers can be interpreted as a long and painful peregrination (not without digressions) to find a characteristic voice, an individual face, an authentic role in society. Paradoxically enough Cuban Church has arrived to the desired self-identification in our days. The documents of Cuban National Church Encounter (*Encuentro Nacional Eclesial Cubano*, further: ENEC) in 1986 are evidences of the renewal.¹

In the early 20th century period of transition from colonial to republican era the majority of the Cubans thought the Church an alien, obsolete and anti-Cuban force. The masculine part of the population thought religion fit for women and children only and did not even attend Mass. The 19th century social and economical processes played an important role in the formation of irreligiousness and anticlericalism and even more important was the conflict developing from the middle third of the century between the Cubans' gradual awakening to national consciousness and the Catholic Church representing Spanish colonial interests.

No matter how strange it may sound, the first losses of the Church were caused by the 19th century great economic change towards the dominance of a sugar plantation economics, based on slave labour. Sugar transformed Cuban society. Slaves in huge waves were transported to the Island; around 1873 their number mounted already about half a million. The Church could not meet the requirements of the challenge embodied in the problems of Christianizing the slaves and assimilating them in the standards of colonial Catholicism. The slave learned some catechism and got baptized compelled by his master who was obliged to do so by the law under penalty of excommunication. But the slave did not

¹ See: *Encuentro Nacional Eclesial Cubano*. Documento Final e Instrucción de los Obispos - further: ENEC. Don Bosco, Roma, 1987

turn into a true Christian. Under the thin polish of superficial Catholicism elements of African cultures and religions lived on and got new fresh impulses from the endless slave transports. Keeping and saving African identity meant protesting against submission and in a certain sense it can be called the ideology of revolt. All what Catholicism could achieve was the gradual penetration of Christian teaching into African religiousness, a fusion resulting in special syncretic cults like the *santería*.

In all probability the syncretic cults were already present in the popular ideologies of last century's struggles for independence. At least there is the fact that 60 percent of the *mambí* soldiers of the 1895-98 Liberation War came from coloured people, and a great number of them had been fighting already in the Ten Years War (1868-1878).²

In the 20ieth century religious syncretism influenced strongly the poorer strata of the white population as well especially in the slums of the big cities and in the backward parts of the country (e.g. Oriente).

The Catholic Church had refused to take notice for a very long time of the wide currency and spread of the syncretic cults and regarded them condemnable superstitions. The 1986 National Church Encounter brought about a change in judgement. The Final Document of the ENEC admits that the religiousness of the majority of Cuban population may be connected with the syncretic cults. According to the Document, this religiousness is dispersing on a wide scale. As one extreme, the variants of spiritualism and African animism are in touch with Catholicism only slightly and superficially. Popular Catholicism hued by African beliefs signifies the other end.³

The identity crisis of 19th century Church led to the unpopularity of Church in the early 20ieth century. From the middle third of the 19th century the Clergy turned against the developing Cuban national consciousness, turned down the thought of independence, and identified itself with the interests of the Spanish

2 Poumier, María: *Apuntes sobre la vida cotidiana en Cuba en 1898*. Ed. Ciencias Sociales, La Habana, 1975, p. 62.

3 ENEC, p. 80.

Crown. This behaviour was the logical consequence of the Spanish policy. Having lost almost all the American colonies in the early 19th century, the Spanish state made enormous efforts to keep Cuba, to suppress the independence movement and by applying the Right of patronage made the Church an obedient servant. During the course of the 19th century the rehispanisation of Cuban Church was carried out.⁴ The Chairs of the Archbishop of Santiago de Cuba and the Bishop of Habana were given exclusively to Spaniards from the home country and even the lesser church dignities fell victims to the invasion of clerics from Spain.

Data clearly reflect that as a result Cubans were abandoning Church career. A faint glow of the 18th century golden age of Church still lingered in 1817 when 1044 priests and clerics took care of the spiritual welfare of a population counting half a million people. By 1857 this total nearly reached one million while the number of clergy lessened to 438.⁵ The decrease was partly due to certain anti-clerical measures of Spanish liberalism e.g. the secularization of monastic properties in the early 1840ies.⁶ But the tendency of decrease went on during the colonial era. When the independence of the country was declared the total number of priests and clerics in Cuba was hovering around 300 (exact data are not known).⁷

According to the ENEC Document, this was a painful period of decline and decadence marked by the impoverishment and bad administration of a grievously manipulated Church, by the disintegration of spiritual welfare services and by the moral decline of the clergy.⁸

In the Ten Years War (1868-1878) and in the Liberation War (1895-1898) the Church physically disappeared from many parts of the country. The fighting parties

4 ENEC, p. 37.

5 Prien, Hans-Jürgen: *La historia del cristianismo en América Latina*, Salamanca, 1985, pp. 961-962.

6 Leiseca, Juan Martín: *Apuntes para la Historia Eclesiástica de Cuba*, Carasa y Ca., La Habana, 1938 pp. 152-156.

7 José Luciano Franco said in interview that there were only 7-8 Cuban-born priests in a total of 2-300. See: Poumier op. cit. p. 186.

8 ENEC, p. 37.

often used occupied church buildings as hospitals or barracks and almost as often set them on fire to prevent the enemy from using them.

There were several priests of Cuban origins who supported the claim for independence. When the 1868 revolution broke out the Spanish military authorities arrested six priests including 82 years old Father Pedro Nolasco Alberre charged with conspiracy and sent them into exile. Parish priest Francisco Esquemebre from Cumanayagua was shot on suspicion of betrayal. Others like Father Braulio Odio from Santiago de Cuba followed their flock to the war and worked as army chaplains in the mambi army.⁹

But a priest sympathizing or even co-operating with the forces of independence was a rare exception of the period. Cubans have in mind more lasting memories of the Church working against revolution and independence and singing thanksgiving *Te Deum* in churches when the death of José Martí, Antonio Maceo and other independence leaders were announced.¹⁰

The ENEC Document tells that at the beginning of the republican era the Church faced the greatest danger and challenge in the irreligiousness of the masses, in anticlericalism, in the lack of religious culture and in indifference.¹¹ The termination of colonial rule caused a radical alteration in the position of the Catholic Church and created a new situation. A crisis in Church authority was ahead because the two prelates and the Spanish priests and clerics left the island in company with the Spanish soldiers.

Between 1898-1902 i.e. in the period of the first USA occupation of Cuba the American military government executed the separation of State and Church and declared liberty of religion and conscience. This concept was codified by the 1901 Constitution of the republic created under heavy American patronage. The principle of the separation of State and Church is present in later constitutions as well:

9 Leiseca, op. cit. p. 186. and 188.

10 See: Kirk, John M.: *'Ante el Volcán. La Iglesia en la Cuba prerrevolucionaria'*. Revista Latinoamericana de Teología, UCA, San Salvador, Año V. No. 13. (1988), p. 69.

11 ENEC, p. 39.

the progressive 1940 Constitution and the 1976 Constitution of socialist Cuba also contain it.¹²

In the years of first occupation the USA military government reorganized education and health service. The educational monopoly of Church was put to an end and nuns and monks were removed from public education. As a part of the reform secular education was declared and religious instruction was forbidden in state schools. Though from the 1930ies the Church protested against it several times this decree stayed in force in the whole period of the "neocolonial republic". Religious school instruction was given only in private schools.

Establishing the republic more liberal reforms were codified. Civil marriage and civil registration likewise the termination of the Church's right of disposal over cemeteries can be mentioned. These measures caused further decline in the low enough prestige of the Church and resulted financial losses as well.

So the Catholic Church has lost the old privileges of the colonial era and, moreover, her religious monopoly got to an end. The USA authorities openly supported the entering of Protestant Churches and sects. The 1943 census mentions already 20 Protestant denominations.¹³ Nowadays there are more than 50.¹⁴ In the 1950ies their congregation was estimated 200.000 people. Nowadays the number of the active Protestants in Cuba is estimated a couple of ten thousands.

At the beginning of the republican era the problem of economic independence was a special case for the Church. In the last century of the colonial era the Church was not independent economically, her possessions and estates were under Spanish Crown control, her functioning depended on government subventions and private donations.

12 See: Pichardo, Hortensia: *Documentos para la Historia de Cuba*. Vol. II., La Habana, 1979, p. 79.; *Nueva Constitución de la República de Cuba*. Luz-Hilo, 1940, p. 37.; *Constitución de la República de Cuba*. Ed. Departamento de Orientación Revolucionaria del CC del PCC. La Habana, 1976, pp. 38-39.

13 *República de Cuba*. Censo del año 1943. P. Fernandez y Cía. Habana, pp. 330-331.

14 Gonzalez, Doria: *Iglesias y Creyentes en Cuba Socialista*. Ed. Cultura Popular. La Habana, 1987, pp. 16-18.

The Act declaring the separation of State and Church prohibited government-subvention of the Churches. Theoretically the Catholic Church had to become self-supporting from her own incomes. This need gave a definite answer to the question of primacy in re-conquering the different strata of society and printed out the necessary direction of social orientation. Practically government subvention did not stop completely. The Church was regularly allotted donations not indicated in state budget. As another form of support the Cuban state undertook the obligations of the Spanish State and indemnified for the Church properties secularized in the 19th century liberal era. This case had been started by the American military government, the properties had been evaluated 2 million dollars and the Cubans payed with government securities yielding 5 percent a year.¹⁵

As a summary we can conclude that the early 20ieth century demanded from the Church a start towards transforming herself into a national institution.

The Church answered the social challenges of the new period with a comprehensive reorganisation characterized by turning towards Rome (*romanización*) and - at least at the beginning - by striving to **cubanize the Church**. In this process the Vatican established six dioceses between 1903 and 1912 in the place of the colonial two (i.e. the Archbishopric of Santiago de Cuba and the Bishopric of Habana). So a church district system corresponding with the state administration scheme was developed and stabilized. The last diocese of our time around Holguin was established by the Vatican not earlier than 1979. In 1903 Pinar del Río and Cienfuegos, in 1912 Camagüey and Matanzas were established. The importance of the Habana diocese was acknowledged in 1925 when Pope Pius XI. gave it the rank of Archbishopric.¹⁶ The reorganization brought about the appointment of Cuban-born priests to higher church dignities even Bishoprics in the early times of the republic.

In 1912 in spite of the slow return of Spanish clerics and the settling down of some USA resident orders the total number of priests and monks was not more

15 *Historia de Cuba*. Ed. Dirección Política de las F. A. R. La Habana, 1968, pp. 522-523.

16 ENEC, p. 39.; Leiseca, op. cit. p. 208, 212, 253.

than 371 in Cuba.¹⁷ The lack of priests and the demand to strengthen the national character urged the Church to try to make church career more attractive and to extend the training of priests. This attempt brought only very modest success and as for strengthening the national character of the Church it was in fact a failure. As late as 1955 only 133 seminarists came from a population mounting already to six million.¹⁸ The Church had been filling the gap with "Spanish import". As a consequence by the fifties Cuban Catholic Church was scarcely more than a "missionary outpost of Spain" as Margaret E. Crahan calls it.¹⁹ More than 80 percent of her staff consisted of Spaniards. The report of the Cuban bishops to the first, 1955 conference of the CELAM (Latin American Bishops Conference) contains more detailed data. According to the document, out of 220 parish priests only 95 were Cuban; out of 461 ordained monks only 30. Female orders, sisterhoods had 1872 members with 556 Cuban nuns in them. The majority of 329 monks not ordained was foreigner as well.²⁰

This structure alone prevented the Church from perceiving the country's social tensions in their true dimensions and made her identification with the people's interests weak and poor. We must not forget the fact stressed by John M. Kirk that the majority of these Spanish priests had been educated in Franco's Spain and had a world view based on the refusal of any kind of leftist thinking. In certain cases even a sympathy with the Falangist movement could be discerned. The conservatism of their education and thinking manifested itself in the conflict of Church and Revolution after 1959.²¹

17 *Stimme der Stimmlosen.. Dokumente zum Sozialen Engagement katholischer Christen in Lateinamerika*. Ed. by Kersten Radzimanowski, Union Verlag, Berlin, 1983, p. 246.

18 Treto, Raúl Gómez: *La Iglesia Católica durante la Construcción del Socialismo en Cuba*. (CEHILA), Matanzas, Cuba, 1988, p. 20.

19 Crahan, Margaret E.: 'Cuba: Religion and Revolutionary Institutionalization'. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 17., Part. 2., Nov. 1985, p. 319.

20 Quoted by Treto op. cit. p. 20.

21 Kirk op. cit. p. 74.

The outlines of the Catholic strategy to win the flock back became distinct by the 1920ies, 1930ies. The Church aimed her activities mainly at the upper class bourgeoisie and the urban middle class, and brought less care to bear upon winning the lower strata of society, the industrial and agricultural workers. Big cities became the main fields of work, 85 percent of Church staff concentrated in Habana. Vast territories were left unprovided in the country, especially in the backward parts like the large provinces Las Villas and Oriente. In the lengthy interview given to Frei Betto, Fidel Castro remembers his childhood in Oriente and mentions that they had seen priests very rarely, only once a year when the time of baptizing set in.²² In the country Church presence could be felt only in those districts where the small colonial food or tobacco farmsteads had been surviving. Such traditional sphere of the Church was e.g. Pinar del Río and the major part of the province of Habana. But on the great sugar plantations which dominated the economics of the country the Church was not present for the most part. The *latifundistas*, the wealthy owners were often reluctant to give a few thousand pesos to promote the building of a chapel on the sugar workers' colonies while they donated hundreds of thousands for the building of luxurious Habana churches as Father Guillermo Sardiñas pointed out in an interview referring to his experiences in Las Villas.²³

The lack of the Church's physical presence had an aftermath in the rural majority's superficial identification with the values of Catholicism and even weaker identification with the Church as an institution. In the fifties the AGRUPACIÓN CATÓLICA UNIVERSITARIA, a conservative youth organization under Jesuit leadership published two surveys about the religious feelings and living conditions of the rural population. Their data, especially the shocking statistics of the living conditions, are often quoted all over the world. In this paper I use only a few index numbers concerning the state of affairs in religion.

22 Betto, Frei: *Fidel y la Religión*. Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado, La Habana, 1985, p. 101.

23 Portuondo, Yolanda: *Guillermo Sardiñas. El Sacerdote Comandante*. Ed. Cultura Popular, La Habana, 1987, p. 44.

According to the 1954 survey 96.5% of those interviewed believed the existence of God and a national average of 72.5% declared themselves to be Catholics. But only 24 percent of the Catholics visited Mass regularly, 42 percent went only occasionally. 31 percent visited Church now and then in a couple of years. But very different are the index numbers characterizing the religious feelings of the rural population. In rural areas, only 52 percent of those interviewed declared themselves to be Catholics, whereas 41 percent declared themselves "indifferent" as to "religious affiliation".

Statistics slightly differ in different studies but they all show the same tendency: the very low level of practicing religion. 88-93.5 percent of rural family heads had never attended Mass. More than 53 percent of rural workers interviewed declared that they had never seen the parish priest of their district. This group included 27.3 percent of the Catholic peasants, too. 91 percent of the children were baptized but only a meagre 16 percent attained to church marriage. Only 3 or 4 percent trusted in the Church's activities to improve the conditions of agricultural workers.²⁴

The Catholic Church of the first half of the 20th century had an élitist mentality. It has been mentioned that in the "neocolonial republic" the Church regarded the upper classes of society, the leading groups of economic and political life and the urban middle class as the rock giving her a firm stand. What means were in her possession to win these circles, to gain their respect and their financial support, to influence their opinions?

School was far more important than church in this situation. From the early years of the century the network of Catholic elementary and secondary schools and colleges expanded at a good pace. The majority of them were run by monastic orders. In 1914 there were only 55 Catholic colleges in Cuba; in 1955 their number was 212 and they had 61,960 students.²⁵ It is not an overstatement that these church schools brought up and let out the social and intellectual élite of the

24 Quoted by Marimón, Mateo Jover: *"The Church" in Carmelo Mesa-Lago* ed. *Revolutionary Change in Cuba*. Pittsburgh, 1974, pp. 400-401.; see too Kirk: *Ante el Volcán...*, ed. cit. pp. 75-76.

25 *Treto op. cit.* p. 22.

country. The Jesuit schools were especially famous for the high level of education. In theory school fees were not very high. We are informed by Fidel Castro that in the early 40ies in Colegio Belén (Bellehem College) of Habana which was regarded the most élitist college of the country, boarders payed about 50 dollars per month.²⁶ But in practice private school fees (even those of cheaper elementary schools) were inaccessible for the children of the low-income majority.

The strategical importance of education is signified by the fact that a greater percentage of church staff worked in and for it than in the parishes.

In 1955 90 percent of monks not ordained (299) were teaching and one third of ordained monks (153 out of 461) worked in education as well. In like manner education was the vital part of the activities of sisterhoods, 1167 nuns out of 1872 worked as teachers. Between 1946 and 1959 three Catholic private universities were founded by the Augustine Order, the Jesuits and the La Salle Brothers. The Saint Thomas of Villanueva University run by the Augustine Order counted ca. 1000 students coming from the wealthiest families of the country.²⁷

Reorganized congregations, religious associations, secular Catholic societies with the bulk of middle-class members became another field to gain influence. Keeping to the spirit of the social doctrine of Pope Pius XI. the majority of these organizations were active in charity work under the "New-Christianity" slogan of re-christianization society. The CABALLEROS CATÓLICOS (1925), the FEDERACIÓN DE JUVENTUDES CATÓLICAS (1928), the AGRUPACIÓN CATÓLICA UNIVERSITARIA (1931) can be mentioned. By 1943 the four sections of the ACCIÓN CATÓLICA were fully developed. By the fifties the new youth organisations specialized mainly on students and intellectuals inside the Acción Católica (JUVENTUD UNIVERSITARIA CATÓLICA, JUVENTUD ESTUDIANTIL CATÓLICA etc.).

The rich choice of church journals and periodicals served also as means to win the middle-class and the political-economical élite.²⁸

26 Betto op. cit. p. 141.

27 Treto op. cit. p. 22; Kirk op. cit. p. 74.

28 See: Leiscea op. cit. p. 257.

The Church strategy proved to be succesful in the last analysis. As John M. Kirk points out, in the fifties it was fashionable in the leading circles to be a Catholic. The major daily papers e.g. conservative *Diario de la Marina* reflected this when they started separate columns for Church news and spred Church opinion on social and cultural problems.²⁹

In the republic era the Church attached herself to the power as a "sleep partner" and only occasionally touched politics until the 40ies. She had not formed a standpoint of her own in the principal social, political, national problems intriguing the public. She kept quiet about the USA interventions, the Machado dictatorship, the suppression of the 1933-35 revolution, etc. From the 40ies the Church and the connected Catholic organizations got slowly engaged in politics, adopting the anticommunist mentality of Pope Pius XII. After World War II the Church joined the policy of Cold War, attacking above all the People's Socialist Party i.e. the communists in her statements.

The role of the Church and the Catholics in the struggle against Batista in the pre-revolutionary period is a highly controversial question. I judge most outstanding the deed of MONS. PÉREZ SERANTES, the Archbishop of Santiago de Cuba who interceded personally on behalf of Fidel Castro and thus saved his life after the failure of the attack against the Moncada barraks. He was lead by humanitarian intentions not by political considerations.

The Church as institution tried to retain her neutrality and stay out of the conflict between dictator and nation even after the guerilla war broke out. But the worth of this behaviour was diminished by the widely known excellent personal relationship between Cardinal Manuel Arteaga, Archbishop of Habana, and the dictator. This fact suggested the appearance of legitimacy of Batista's rule. From the beginning of 1958 in Church circles discussions started and went on concerning the future of the country.

There were Bishops who proposed that the Church should initiate making Batista resign. This proposal was broken down by the conservatism and hesitation of the bishopric corporation. Officially the Church did nothing against Batista.

²⁹ Kirk op. cit. p. 77.

The silence of the Church, the prelates' policy of waiting reflected the uncertainties and hesitations of the middle-class which was the principal social basis of the Church but this silence can't be called the standpoint of the total of active believers. The very same middle class, the groups of socially and politically responsive intellectual youth gave the bulk of those Christians who consciously undertook the anti-Batista struggle. The majority of them took part in urban resistance but a great number took up arms and was fighting in the guerilla war. An outstanding representative of these groups was JOSÉ ANTONIO ECHEVERRÍA, the martyred Catholic leader of the fighting Habana students. Protestant FRANK PAÍS was the second man of July 26 Movement until his death in 1957. The fermentation inside the clergy can be illustrated by the example of the life of father GUILLERMO SARDIÑAS. He joined Castro's guerillas as early as 1957 and went up to the Sierra Maestra. Though he did not take up arms and he worked as army chaplain his behaviour was of great political importance and made enormous impression on public opinion. The revolutionary government acknowledged his merits by giving him the highest military rank of the day: he was promoted *comandante*. In the last phase some moderate and even politically conservative Catholic groups like that of MANUEL ARTIMÉ joined the armed fight against Batista.

Names and examples could be multiplied. Fidel Castro also acknowledged several times that Cuban Catholics had resolutely supported the case of freedom.

I put greater emphasis on the phenomenon that until 1959 ideological factors like the problem of religiousness or atheism played a secondary role in the struggle against dictatorship. Being convinced of the illegitimity of the dictatorship which had come to power by military coup, brought forth a temporary political concord among people with widely raging world views. The July 26 Movement itself was not homogenous in this aspect. It functioned as a special 'collective and collecting party' in which various ideological and political tendencies were living together in the years of struggle. Differentiation and separation showed themselves only after the victory in the debates about the new social and political order.

The best known and elaborated phase of the history of Cuban Catholicism has been the last three decades. It seems pointless in this short paper to repeat facts

and events exposed and surveyed by others. In the conclusion I point out only some relevant tendencies and connections of the subject.

The period is marked by the painful proceeding from conflict to the beginning of dialogue in the relationship of Church and a State based on socialist-communist principles. In his objective and factual book - *La Iglesia Católica durante la Construcción del Socialismo en Cuba* - Cuban Catholic author RAÚL GÓMEZ TRETO distinguishes five inner phases in the course of shaping Church and State relationship: dissension (1959-60), confrontation (1961-62), evasion (1963-67), encounter (1968-69) and dialogue (1979-85).³⁰ Other authors use basically similar periodisations though slight differences can be discerned as well.

According to Mateo Jover Marimón, the Church opened towards dialogue as early as 1969.³¹ John M. Kirk holds the view that 1969 witnessed only "Emerging from Cocoon" and the Church got from 'Modus vivendi to Dialogue' between 1980-85.³²

Whatever periodisation is applied the role and position of Church was decided and defined by the confrontation of the first years. Dominated by pre-Synod mentality the Church was prepared neither politically nor intellectually for the radical and rapid social and political changes developing from the beginning of 1959. In this situation her leaders made a strategical mistake when in spite of lacking program and proper political experience and miscalculating their power and social influence they undertook to act on behalf of the desorganized bourgeoisie. The full growth of the conflict was urged by the bishops anticipating communist danger - which after all proved to be true - in their declarations and pastoral letters.³³ Some believers and clerics used not only intellectual weapons but changed churches, schools, church buildings and other institutions in general

30 Treto op. cit. p. 26.

31 Marimón op. cit. p. 403.

32 Kirk, John M.: 'Between God and the Party. The Church in Revolutionary Cuba, 1959-1985.'; *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*. Vol. XI. No. 21 (1986), pp. 93-109.

33 E.g. the "Pastoral Letter from the Cuban Episcopate" of August 7, 1960, criticized the rise of communism in Cuba. Quoted by Treto op. cit. pp. 35-37.

into stages of political conspiracy. On this account Catholics on the whole became suspected of being counter-revolutionaries and the revolutionary government, shifting rapidly leftwards, naturally took repressive measures. In the days of the Playa Girón (Bay of Pigs) invasion the security forces occupied church buildings and executed preventive arrestments. In summer 1961 the nationalisation of private schools struck a heavy blow on the mental influence of the Church and on her finances as well. The conflict culminated in September 1961 when the government sent a bishop and 131 priests into exile. Later several clerics were imprisoned charged with counter-revolutionary activities.³⁴

The period of confrontation was not a conflict of faith and atheism. It was a definitely political antagonism in which the social conservatism and dogmatic anticommunism of Church faced the improvised church policy of revolutionary intransigence. As an outcome the Church lost her social positions built up in the former decades. In a short time the majority of active believers and supporters emigrated. The bourgeoisie as social basis proved to be quicksand instead of firm rock. The emigration of the masses of foreign priests and monks endangered even the normal everyday functions of the Church. The majority (460 persons) chose voluntary emigration instead of keeping the priest's calling in the difficult situation. The total number of clergy had stabilized by the mid-sixties a little above 200. A similar number of social-worker nuns (nursing elderly and sickly people) had stayed in the country.

In the period of confrontation Cuban Catholic Church was being tempted by the hamartia of Greek tragedies. Her tragic flaw was to have secular aims completely differing from and even opposing to the short-distance interests of the people, her true potential basis.

Since the 1959 Revolution both Church and Cuban reality have undergone considerable changes. There has developed a society with basically atheist education and monolithic political structure but with the surviving presence of Christian traditions and cultural values. Focusing on the idea of moral responsibility for progress the Church has been re-formulating the principles of her social mission

34 Treto op. cit. p. 48., pp. 58-59.

from the early-seventies. Two pastoral letters of the Bishops' Conference signified the opening in 1969 ("Cuban Bishops Call for End of Trade Blockade", "On Contemporary Atheism") while the climax set in with the mentality embodied in the Final Document of 1986 National Church Encounter (ENCUENTRO NACIONAL ECLESIAL CUBANO). This important document leaves no doubt that the Church has revised her historical role, had adopted the main Latin-American results of the Catholic *aggiornamento* and as a supporter and mild critic of socialist development she won respect in spite of the small member of believers, estimated 75-100 thousand in the 80ies.

The consolidation of her prestige has been supported by the strengthening of Latin-American Catholic progressives, which from the late 70ies several times has prompted Cuban party leadership propound the possibility of strategical alliance between communists and Christians.³⁵

But in Cuba herself achieving such a "new tie" - as suggested by the Final Document of the ENEC as well - demands a lengthy dialogue and the settlement of unsolved problems.

35 See e.g.: *Programa del Partido Comunista de Cuba*. Ed. Política, La Habana, 1986, p. 187.; *Resoluciones Aprobados por el II Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba*. Ed. Política, 1981, p. 57.; Betto op. cit., etc.

AZ EGYHÁZ ÉS A TÁRSADALMI KIHÍVÁSOK A MODERN KUBÁBAN

A tanulmány azokat a főbb társadalmi kihívásokat tekinti át, elemzi, amelyekkel a katolikus egyháznak szembe kellett néznie a "modern időkben": a 19. sz. második felétől napjainkig. Megállapítja, hogy az egyház befolyásának csökkenése és a vallás térvesztése nem pusztán az 1959-es forradalom következménye. Kuba a 20. században Latin-Amerika legkevésbé vallásos országa.

Ennek egyik fő oka, hogy a 19. sz. második felében a gyarmati egyház a spanyol érdekekkel azonosult, elutasította a függetlenségi törekvéseket. A századfordulón, a függetlenség elnyerése idején sokan elfordultak az egyháztól, mint "idegen" intézménytől. Az egyház térvesztésének másik alapvető oka, hogy nem tudott megfelelni annak a kihívásnak, amit a rabszolgák evangelizálása vetett fel, tovább éltek az afrikai kultuszok, illetve katolikus elemekkel átszőtt szinkretikus vallásosság alakult ki, amely ma is jellemzi a lakosság tekintélyes hányadát.

Az ún. "újgyarmati köztársaság" évtizedeiben az egyház a középrétegeket tekintette fő bázisának, befolyását elsősorban a magániskolák, a világi katolikus egyletek és a katolikus sajtó révén növelte. "Elfeledkezett" viszont a lakosság döntő többségét alkotó szegényekről, különösen a vidék szegényeiről.

A legnagyobb kihívás századunkban az 1959-es forradalmat követő gyors társadalmi és politikai átalakulás volt az egyház számára, amellyel múltja és Zsinat előtti konzervativizmusa miatt képtelen volt azonosulni. Az állam és az egyház közötti konfliktus a hatvanas évek elején működési terének, befolyásának beszűkülését eredményezte. A ma egyháza nehéz körülmények között, és fájdalmas tapasztalatok árán jutott el társadalmi szerepének újrafogalmazásához.

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